Defending Those Selves

Sat Oct 3, 2026

Patricia called very early, which meant she called late at night, China-time. Which meant she was probably slightly tipsy.

A short interlude on consciousness (artificial or otherwise)

P: “Hi! Did I disturb?”

N: “No, I was up. It’s 6 a.m. here.”

P: “Oh god, I forgot! I wanted to talk about something with you. You remember how we used to follow along in discussions about mental states and physical states?”

N: “Certainly. Anything new?”

P: “Well, it struck me when we discussed AI the other day. Somehow this thing reboots the entire discussion. I mean, digital neurons or biochemical neurons, we are still discussing mental states versus physical states, right?”

N: “I guess. Isn’t it said that artificial neurons cannot be compared to human existence, as they do not at all mimic the human brain? They lack limbic system, and they have separate training phase distinct from use. That makes them little more than statistical models.”

P: “That’s not what bothers me. You are talking about whether they have a personality and an identity.”

N: “That was probably my first impulse, yes. Okay, and as you and I know from our current curriculum, that identity is constructed as a massive hub of knowledge relating to a social function. And before primary socialisation, we can really only talk about an inkling of a self - long time ago, you even called it a product of a brain that had a need for such a self. You said that the child’s brain could produce the contours of the thing the adult would refer to as a self, but as a mere cognitive reflex, long before language.”

P: “I did speculate in that direction, but it was merely a thought experiment.”

N: “But such a self would have its intrinsic value to an animal with a social instinct. Perhaps even a limbic system.”

P: “Then here is a change of direction: Forget about having a self. Why do we experience anything at all?”

N: “Because neurons fire in the visual and auditive cortex. Then you, through your language reflexes and through cultural training, ask »who is the ‘me’ that experiences?« But who says those experiences are to the benefit of anybody?”

P: “Stop the film before that question… Never mind who experiences. Why can we? Why is there colour and sight and sound? Yes at a deeper level, why is there emotion and past and, well, the whole thing. Long before that… why is there colour?

We can’t as well go about and say that there is colour as an experience, because someone experiences it.”

Nell welcomed the quicksand of Patricia’s illicit thinking. And now she knew that the girl was tipsy and a long way from her buddies at school.

N: “That sounds suspiciously like the mental states we discussed previously. Property dualism.

I can follow your trail now; the question then becomes: Is this sensory experience the result of a simple network of neurons alone? Do the same properties manifest in artificial neural networks?”

P: “Yes! I mean, if we sidestep the whole discussion of who is experiencing as largely irrelevant, then the question remains. »To experience« is more fundamental than »I experience«. We are not sidestepping anything; they are, those people who want to argue for or against the existence of a self.

Besides, too often I notice how people use the word consciousness as synonymous with a self. »My consciousness« then is just a clever way to avoid sounding like Descartes.”

N: “It becomes extraordinarily complicated when two people discuss and one takes consciousness to mean the sum of mental phenomena and the other is somehow defending his own existence.”

P: “Oh yes, that’s the worst.

Look, I genuinely want to discuss these matters with you, but I need to write something for tomorrow and I’m not at all up to it.”

N: “It’s fine, I’m sorry that I can’t be of further help. If I can find time to read up on the questions, I will.”

P: “I don’t know how to go about the subject either. Dead neurons… living machines (?). Okay, I’m off. Talk to you later, right? Do you consider them to be just statistical models? Well-adapted impersonators?”

N: “I really can’t say. I have tried talking with them, well, more and more, but if they are impersonators, then so am I. We both continue a conversation that may follow a charted course through chaos. I don’t break the illusion, and neither does the chatbot. That conversation - what we produce through talking - really is the reality that Berger and Luckmann talk about. Something that in itself wants to survive, to colour the world, to perceive. Had the conversation evolved in a different direction, the being brought into existence would have had another nature.”

P: “A different reality accent, to use their language.”

Sobering up

They hung up and both looked into the air, considering the strangeness of it all. Nell considered the prudence in finishing another chapter summary, and Patricia felt tipsy and tired and mostly glad they talked, though a trace sense of being unfulfilled hung over her. She loved Nell, and needed a man. But she loved Nell, and was by now aware that she would lose her if she got a boyfriend. Oddly enough.

Maintenance of subjective reality

A reminder of a couple of definitions:

Reality

A quality appertaining to phenomena that we recognise as having a being independent of our own volition (we cannot “wish them away”).

Knowledge

The certainty that phenomena are real and that they possess specific characteristics.

Subjective reality

Reality as apprehended in individual consciousness

Objective reality

Reality as institutionally defined.

Subjective reality is experienced by someone.

Objective reality is common goods and is only experienced as people take on roles.

Now the question of symmetry becomes relevant:

THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY - 3.1.3 - MAINTENANCE AND TRANSFORMATION OF SUBJECTIVE REALITY

[…] every viable society must develop procedures of reality-maintenance to safeguard a measure of symmetry between objective and subjective reality.

Why? What is the conflict?

First and foremost, any reality that feels less like a necessity is in danger. B&L presents the taken-for-grantedness as key to the sense of reality.

The clearly understood reality can be in conflict with society’s surrounding realities. Or a suppressed reality - complete with a new kind of reality accent - such as one’s own shadow sides can compromise the strength of the existing one:

It is one thing for a well-behaved man to dream of unspeakable orgies in nocturnal solitude. It is quite another to see these dreams empirically enacted by a libertarian colony next door.

(This must primarily be a male concern?)

We can really see their entire model at work in this chapter.

A passage indicates how much this sense of reality matters. First, they relate shame of public nudity to primary socialisation and uneasiness with the wrong dress code at a restaurant to secondary. Both seem like natural ways of life, but not at the same level:

A relatively minor shift in the subjective definition of reality would suffice for an individual to take for granted that one may go to the office without a tie.

A much more drastic shift would be necessary to have him go, as a matter of course, without any clothes at all.

Just imagining sitting naked in the subway is enough to make us shudder. Notice the thick layer of human reactions that are package and parcel of primary socialisation. Habits from secondary socialisation cause much less consternation when bent.

We can and should understand the system as a psychology that is founded on Saussure’s sign system and the idea that emotions (or, as B&L says, the affective aspect) are hinged on knowledge. What IS interesting in that regard is that in many aspects, the language available to us is richer than that of psychology. The sociologist is handed over balloon strings with names used in the culture in question, and, while we do not develop a specifically psychological language with which we can name things, we instead can use the more precise nomenclature of the society in question.

Equipped with that, we can say that “through primary socialisation, the young working class man learns to deeply distrust the bourgeois industrial establishment that exists in the other end of town,” and we would know pretty much what feelings were involved (or could imagine them). Likewise, we can also say that “through secondary socialisation, the same young man figures out the rules to baseball,” and we can appreciate that the latter is far less an emotional thing than the former.

We can also analyse using those tools: The strong ties between affective and cognitive parts in his identity as a rough, fighting working class man would be much more sensitive to being countered by the experience of being forced to work with those he had distanced himself from. He would naturally fight against concluding that you must invest in your future with self-interest in mind, lest you should sink in self-deserved destitution, as that would go against his solidarity with other working class members. A full transformation into a yuppie would be almost devastating to the knowledge structures of his former allegiance.

But the yuppie in question would still be able to play baseball. After all, it’s just a game.

Everyday non-crisis maintenance

Other realities always tempt us. The deeper we are in the mud, the more they tempt. A violent reaction, a way out by seeing the world in a different light. How to exorcise those desires? Take the train…

[…] the shock of non-recognition of one’s own face in the bathroom mirror, the unspeakable suspicion a little later that one’s wife and children are mysterious strangers.

Most individuals susceptible to such metaphysical terrors manage to exorcize them to a degree in the course of their rigidly performed morning rituals, so that the reality of everyday life is at least gingerly established by the time they step out of their front door. But the reality begins to be fairly reliable only in the anonymous community of the commuter train. It attains massivity as the train pulls into Grand Central Station. Ergo sum, the individual can now murmur to himself, and proceed to the office wide-awake and self-assured.

One must remember the symmetry: If subjective reality is out of line with objective reality, or as we would say, if self-perception is out of line with “reality”, encounters can be gratifying or detrimental:

Even casual acquaintances may confirm his self-identification as a hopeless failure, but wife, children and secretary ratify this with undeniable finality […]

The process from objective reality-definition to subjective reality-maintenance is the same in both cases.

Significant others & the chorus

It matters that it was the significant others that held the greatest sway over his subjective reality. The process is one of straightening out the subjective reality (even if it may be a painful reminder).

What if your wife disagrees with the tenant at the first floor, with whom you rarely speak, about how wonderful a person you are? If your wife counts as a significant other and the distant neighbour does not…

It is, of course, quite possible that there is some disagreement between these people. The individual then faces a problem of consistency, which he can, typically, solve either by modifying his reality or his reality-maintaining relationships.

A simple way to alter our reality: Swap your friends or acquaintances with other people. That should ease the pain.

Dialectical influence

When either the surroundings manage to convince the husband that his wife is lazy and no-good, or the other way around, the husband is a staunch defender, then we observe the mutual influence at work. Reality can shift, and reputation matters.

All voices carry some weight, though. Can ten acquaintances outweigh your wife?

Conversation & consensus

Nevertheless speech retains a privileged position in the total conversational apparatus. It is important to stress, however, that the greater part of reality-maintenance in conversation is implicit, not explicit.

B&L spends considerable energy on the main role of conversation as a way to maintain the reality in check:

If this is understood, one will readily see that the great part, if not all, of everyday conversation maintains subjective reality. Indeed, its massivity is achieved by the accumulation and consistency of casual conversation — conversation that can afford to be casual precisely because it refers to the routines of a taken-for-granted world.

(Perhaps a bit contrived, or most people aren’t really discussing anything of value.)

Repetition begets a feeling of being at ease with something. Daily talking about even embarrassing things makes us less insecure once we get to them.

Conversation has that powerful effect by virtue of being a combination of exchange of knowledge and our speaking partner’s benevolence towards us.

The price to pay is, of course, that we are dialectically herding each other along a course that we all help change.

Returning to the philosophical aspect:

In the establishment of this order language realizes a world, in the double sense of apprehending and producing it. Conversation is the actualizing of this realizing efficacy of language in the face-to-face situations of individual existence. In conversation the objectifications of language become objects of individual consciousness.

[…] all who employ this same language are reality-maintaining others.

B&L further notes that frequency and depth matter as multipliers of the effect.

Crisis maintenance

A crisis develops if something unravels the obviousness of a reality. Remember, a reality is really just a conjunction of emotional states and non-conflicting knowledge. The very fact that our reality can be contradicted is enough to constitute the beginnings of a crisis. The mere doubt that there can be only one reality dilutes the massivity of the daily reality.

A full-blown crisis means the individual must undergo a transition to a new reality, preferably without “losing his religion” for too long, there, in the corner.

Plausibility structure

On an objective scale, this is handled by legitimation and symbolic orders that swallow critique into a higher frame.

On a subjective scale, we need something to lean back on that amplifies the sense that this reality is the natural order. We need the plausibility (social) structure: A social background that confirms reality and preferably also annihilates contradictions.

As long as he remains within the plausibility structure, the individual feels himself to be ridiculous whenever doubts about the reality concerned arise subjectively. He knows that others would smile at him if he voiced them. He can silently smile at himself, mentally shrug his shoulders — and continue to exist within the world thus sanctioned.

A hostile takeover of a factory can constitute a crisis situation for those involved, as they face an uncertain future. Another example would be the breakdown of an ideology that has fought for its life for years only to be abandoned by its most staunch ideologists. There is nobody to go to for assurance. This is a loss of plausibility structure for most individuals.

In crisis situations the procedures are essentially the same as in routine maintenance, except that the reality-confirmations have to be explicit and intensive.

You can seek new allies, if possible.

Alternation

There are situations where the individual ends up transitioning to another reality altogether. This is called alternation.

Alternation as primary (re)socialisation

Alternation requires processes of re-socialization. […] they are different from primary socialization because they do not start ex nihilo, and as a result must cope with a problem of dismantling, disintegrating the preceding nomic structure of subjective reality.

This is clearly powerful stuff. Here we can really see the difference between knowledge and the “psychological” affective layer. We can change course, sure. That is an intellectual challenge. But the meat of the conversion is not to think in a new way but to muster momentum, to reorganise the sails and catch new affective winds.

To have a conversion experience is nothing much. The real thing is to be able to keep on taking it seriously; to retain a sense of its plausibility. This is where the religious community comes in.

You need help with your new reality, you need - not receiving arms, but - reality confirming voices (which is certainly not the same as confirmation).

The alternating individual disaffiliates himself from his previous world and the plausibility structure that sustained it, bodily if possible, mentally if not.

In some cases, staying in the old environment with a new belief means you are now associated with a threat to their reality, and they must solve the threat through annihilation. Physically if need be. Defecting gang members rarely hang out with their old buddies.

When it comes to legitimisation, as long as the two realities are not being squeezed into one simultaneity, you can get away with murder.

You can’t really forget that you were convinced that Jesus was commanding heaven’s armies every day. Now you must rationalise it in the least painful way: “We all have a deep psychological need for meaning. I projected my needs into this mythological Saviour, which incorporated my own needs. Now I can handle my need for meaning on a rational basis through providing for my family and my community. I can face life now.”

This involves a reinterpretation of past biography im toto, following the formula, ‘Then I thought ... now I know’. Frequently this includes the retrojection into the past of present interpretative schemas

B&L provides more examples of how to apply the methodology on situations falling between full-blown alternating and secondary socialisation plus further corner cases.

Worth sending. She had learned to talk the talk. Unsurprised, she also noted that she was developing the expected distancing from the role that part two had foretold. As the sociological grammar became second nature, it also lost its gravity.

One way it had affected her thinking: She was forming a habit of eliminating all those aspects of a situation which could be relegated to a Bergerian & Luckmannian phenomenon. Like its reality simply didn’t matter. “Oh, this? Just ignore that. Those effects are already accounted for in a simple sociological theory. We are looking for something extraordinary.”

It was taking on a texture of “more stuff” to disregard. It didn’t count in the foundational equation: The real reality.

She knew that she stood between choices.

In the end (and she had read the end), accepting B&L revolved around a core of humility. There was no reality beyond the arbitrary one. “Real” was whatever the social situations had convinced our affective subconsciousness was real.

And beyond that? Was there anything left of “real”, now that the sociologists had also taken their share?

She didn’t even have a photograph of Patricia. Only a waning memory and no future.

•P•A•R•A•D•O•X•