It was nice for Benedict to see Maurice struggle with the available data. Most likely he had reached the same level of confusion that Benedict himself had reached. Their cerebra were turning into pendulums or, rather, rats in mazes, which spent a few hours in one end until it decided which of the possible routes was the only way out. When the rat-brain had meandered itself to the other end, the pendulum started swinging back.
Everything obvious turned decidedly non-obvious if you examined it closely enough. Ukrainians were obviously right in their incessant condemnation of the aggressor. Resistance was the only viable alternative. And the Russians were obviously correct in their assumption that the West had it in for them. NATO as a “neutral” body was simply a ridiculous thought. Spoken out loudly in the wrong company would have made anybody blush.
Any attempt at asserting a cultural pride (which is what all nations do apparently as an aspect of human psychology) would be interpreted as an ambition towards cultural superiority. Everybody accused everybody of seeing themselves as the master race, but they all express immense pride in their own culture.
Liberal platitudes about freedom of speech meant just as little as similarly socialist platitudes about helping the poor. All governments have those goals. Something else seems to be driving the world.
Benedict had long felt his old approaches were inadequate, or perhaps he had let himself be confused by the close proximity with the internal thought processes of the Ukrainians seen up close.
Now that predicament had grabbed hold of Maurice as well.
“What do you suggest”, he asked Maurice, who wandered deeper and deeper into the woods.
“People rationalise their sentiments. I don’t want to waste my time on rationalisations. On the other hand, what we call rationalisations can very well be precise expressions of how people feel.”
“In foreign policy a lot of those explanations are about how the other part is thinking. What both Ukrainian and Russian officials demonstrate are very poor judgements about how their “adversaries” think and feel. In particular, cultural identity seems to be the joker here.”
Maurice awaiting the continuation, Benedict carried on:
“We have often talked about how identity weighs in. Example: You and I could hypothetically be completely in sync about something. Then some other friend invite me to a movie, not you. You never get to see the movie in question. It turns out to be a major phenomenon across town, and afterwards when we talk together, I constantly interrupt our conversation with small remarks to passersby I recognise having seen the same movie. Imagine a hand sign or a way to dress or remark that were distinctive cultural signs of that movie. Now you suddenly feel left out. Months go by and the rift grows into a chasm.”
“But isn’t that a sign that deep down, you wanted to go your separate ways? The shared culture becomes fetters that feel more restraining than liberating.
But should you and I not be more wary about applying interpersonal psychology to something as macroscopic as foreign policy?”
“Well, I don’t think we are talking about foreign policy. That’s Putin, Biden, Zelensky — statesmen with a responsibility. We are talking about what stirs in the minds of the assemblies — people who seem to represent or reflect the human side of things.”
“That thought concurs with at least how thinkers have perceived power struggles in Europe before modernisation added such forces as »nationalism, imperialism, colonialism, ideology and propaganda«. Early strains of international relations studies fell in either the idealist or realist camp. Machiavelli? He belongs to the realist school.”
Contending Theories of International Relations, p. 67
Machiavelli’s emphasis on the need for the
ruler to adopt moral standards different from those of the individualin order to insure the state’s survival, his concern with power, his assumption that politics is characterized by a clash of interests, his pessimistic view of human nature—all these clearly place him within the realist framework.
“Imagine that. Throwing away your ethical compass to rule.”
Benedict felt more at home now.
“I’m not sure that is necessarily the best summary of Machiavelli’s advice. His pragmatic approach is the realist part. Compare with:”
The Prince (Machiavelli) - chapter 17
I’m sure every leader would wish to be seen as compassionate rather than cruel. All the same he must be careful not to use his compassion unwisely. Cesare Borgia was thought to be cruel, yet his cruelty restored order to Romagna and united it, making the region peaceful and loyal. When you think about it, he was much more compassionate than the Florentines whose reluctance to be thought cruel led to disaster in Pistoia.
“We like to attack Machiavelli for being unethical like we like to attack Putin for taking the decisions he made. But that image at least is an oversimplification. Most likely, we just appreciate verbal attacks because it delineates the insiders from the outsiders of our group. The problem Machiavelli describes here is not inherent to despotisms only. We can observe them unfold live in the USA these very days. To many Americans, actually enough to sway an election, the Biden era has unfolded exactly like Machiavelli just described. Now they hope Trump will apply the solution also just described, or at least that Trump’s severity will restore order.”
“What would you say: Does Machiavelli advocate scrupulousness or ethical integrity?”
Benedict was surprised that the question made him hesitate. But he got into a train of thought about Christian absoluteness in ethics that tricked him into wanting to say the opposite of what he really wanted to say. For the moment they both just walked deeper into the forest. Maurice returned to the subject.
“Machiavelli is at the centre of the dispute about ends versus means. I mentioned integrity. Who are we, quintessentially speaking? Our behaviour in times of duress is one suggestion. Some do not compromise on their principles.”
“Isn’t that a false proposition? Machiavelli describes two outcomes, both involving misery. Should the leaders opt for one solution they know will overall bring more suffering than the other? Who’s to say that Cesare Borgia is not a principled person? His principles just happen to involve sacrificing individual freedom for the greater good.”
Maurice pondered.
“I will play along with that thought to see if I can disprove the notion that we can dispense of high ethical principles. Whatever those might turn out to be. We have seen ample evidence in the Duma to know that they too are compassionate with their own. I’m not Ukrainian. I don’t have to replay their hysteria. I can still denounce Russia’s actions on matters of principles.”
“Which principle is that?”
“Number one: The ‘spheres of influence’ mentality is not acceptable. It is an anachronism.”
“How can you just say that?”
Benedict noticed that Maurice had taken an old 1970 second hand book with him on their picnic, Contending Theories of International Relations. He was finding passages.
“This guy, Joseph A. Schumpeter, says it in an interesting way when describing how it is not capitalism but vestiges of old imperialist mentality that causes war. This comes as an answer to the Leninist critique, by the way.”
Contending Theories of International Relations, p. 186
Austrian economist Joseph A. Schumpeter (1883-1950), who insisted that imperialism cannot be reduced to the pursuit of concrete economic interest, when history is replete with examples of societies “that seek expansion for the sake of expanding, war for the sake of fighting, victory for the sake of winning, dominion for the sake of ruling.”
Imperialism [like nationalism] […] is irrational and unconscious, a calling into play of instincts from the dim past. Imperialism, in short, is an atavism in the social culture.
“As mentioned, he argues against seeing capitalism as inherently imperialistic. But I will take the liberty of applying the same logic to any political system believing in the legality of operating beyond its own borders: That mentality is a remnant from a bygone era.”
“According to the same logic, Russia is allowed to perform military manoeuvres inside their own borders. Did USA and Ukraine react with a silent ‘fair enough, their military, their right’?”
“Benedict, Russia invaded.”
Benedict smiled.
“Stop and think. I know you know where I’m going.”
Maurice stopped as requested. Then he smiled slyly and went on.
“You are probably going to say that we knew ‘how they were’ beforehand, which is a prejudice.”
“It’s a prejudice that is cleverly disguised as a well-founded such. We have seen in the Duma how the very presence of animosity towards Russia turns Russians paranoid and suspicious. Russians look at the NATO buildup and foreign investment in Ukraine’s military near the borders of Russia. The West looks at the military buildup near the borders of Ukraine. Both think they are entitled to react on their observations and conviction about the enemy’s motives with escalation.
We bark at the thought that it should somehow be illegal for us to display all sorts of histrionic manias. If it turns out that some country in the world goes on and reacts to our statements, we grow furious. How dare they! Imagine I was saying all sorts of nasty things about you. Then imagine me saying the same things while holding a gun in my hand. Difference?
That textbook you are carrying about international relations points to the difficulty in deducing from microscopic conversations between people to macroscopic events like military actions. But I would like to point out that we can see a direct link between the conversations we observe and the events that play out.”
Contending Theories of International Relations, p.140
Historically, the intellectual chasm between the
macro and the microperspectives of human conflict was nowhere better illustrated than in the earlier polarity ofpsychology and sociology. The former analyzed conflict from a knowledge of individual, the latter from a knowledge of collective behavior.
“According to Durkheim, you and I should duly note how we can deceive ourselves.”
Contending Theories of International Relations, p.140
The sharpness of the cleavage as it was perceived around the turn of the century is reflected in Emile Durkheim’s statement that “every time that a social phenomenon is directly explained as a psychic phenomenon, one may be
sure that the explanation is false.”
Benedict was thinking hard.
“I’m curious where the international relations studies will lead us. For now I have no other tool at my disposal than sticking with what I see: The actual discussions taking place inside Russia and Ukraine. We have the microscope directly focused on the seconds before the war erupts and what people are discussing seems to have everything to do with the escalation.”
They arrived at a clearing in the forest.
“You know what saddens me immensely?”
“No, what?”
“How we how lost so much more than what we have won.”
Contending Theories of International Relations, p.153
When the chivalric code was observed, warfare often took on the aspect of a tournament. […] The sort of ideological differences which often make for absolute struggles to the death were lacking within Europe before the fourteenth century. The outcome of a feudal war often determined who should wield authority over a particular piece of territory, but it did not affect the how of life.
People rarely if ever became emotionally involvedin the issues over which wars were fought.
Maurice had spent too much time with Benedict, he felt, when he started to partake in his political depressions.
On the other hand, there was no denying hysteria accompanied war like ants on a hill.
Contending Theories of International Relations, p.154
The concept of war as a small-scale affair of skirmish and maneuver lost its primacy when large numbers of nonprofessional (i.e., nonchivalric) warriors, both volunteers and mercenaries, became enmeshed with cultural, national or religious antipathies. When a cherished set of values or a way of life was thought to hinge upon the outcome of an encounter,
war became an all-consuming psychological and moral experience.Hence the battles of Antioch, Crecy, Poitiers, Agincourt and Magdeburg were bitter and bloody in the extreme.
Maurice sat and read. He showed the page to Benedict who read it. He looked pale and lifeless. For reasons Maurice never really understood, Benedict took these things so immensely personal.
/PARADOX