Dialogue 15

Wed Feb 4, 2026

22nd November

I still believe that the Protocols are more than just joking around with the Dialogue.

Joly’s political satire contains many provocative insinuations that Golovinski may have been reacting to. These liberal wisenheimers who constantly point their fingers at power. From their moral high ground they can afford joking around since they live in a belief system that automatically frowns upon power and praises freedom. Can’t they see how their precious freedom-equality-brotherhood wrecked their own country?

If they really like Jewish theory so much, hell, let them choke on it.

So Golovinski cranks up the dial and paints a picture of a liberal society in chains. If there is anger, it is directed at the decay these people let in. The revolutionaries who dreamt of a freer society enslaved themselves under a much more devious tyranny.

Or he really is just joking around and the text came out the way it did by random processes. We will never know.

23rd November

I know it is a bit late in the process, but I finally found the urge to read the French Constitution of 1852 to gain a little insight into Napoleon III’s mentality.

In the eleventh hour I realise the extent to which Joly simply patched in pieces from Charles-Louis’s proclamations and the constitution itself.

Consequently Joly is probably writing the Dialogue using somewhat the same approach that Golovinski employs in the Protocols. Another cute little irony in the great food chain of politics.

In many ways, if you hold the words or Charles-Louis Bonaparte himself up against Joly’s Machiavelli, you get the same sensation of words twisted out of proportion that you have from reading the Protocols in parallel with the Dialogue.

24th November

Reading the constitution of 1852 there is little doubt that power was concentrated at the top. France became an empire with an emperor almost with admiration.

Charles-Louis proclaimed these words:

CONSTITUTION OF 1852

I took as my model the institutions which, instead of disappearing at the first breath of popular unrest, were only overthrown by the whole of Europe allied against us.

In short, I said to myself: since France has been functioning for fifty years only by virtue of the administrative, military, judicial, religious, and financial organization of the Consulate and the Empire, why should we not also adopt the political institutions of that era? Created by the same thought, they must carry within them the same character of nationality and practical utility.

Indeed […] our current society [...] is nothing other than France regenerated by the Revolution of 1789 and organized by the Emperor.

Nothing remains of the Ancien Régime but fond memories and great benefits. But everything that was organized then was destroyed by the Revolution, and everything organized since the Revolution that still exists was organized by Napoleon.

To the liberalists hailing back from the reality of the revolution, Charles-Louis’ reign must have been an intolerable blow.

And because they never could accept how the pendulum had swung back, Golovinski could never forgive them.

I still contend that this is the main thrust of the Protocols. We can’t understand the clashes between feudal and liberal regimes.

How could we? We aren’t French.

25th November

Dialogue 15

● King inherits title via male bloodline. ● Universal suffrage for the legislature. ● Candidates must take an oath of loyalty towards their prince and his constitution preceding the election. ● Publicly shamed if they break their oath. ● King has his own candidates. ● People can’t meet and discuss politics, so they vote based on psychology. ● King would have his own fake opposition. ● Countryside folks won’t talk to politically savvy urban folks. ● Only individuals, not parties or lists on the ballot. ● Gerrymandering bad districts out of influence. ● King won’t let the people go sour: Energetic in performing wonders for his people.

Meanwhile on the other end of the spectrum, Machiavelli is having fun uniting two good principles:

He wants to be a king by heredity and he wants to be freely elected by the people.

Montesquieu doesn’t really know how to answer.

Dialogue in Hell between Machiavelli and Montesquieu, Ch. 15 Subtext Constitution of 1852
Montesquieu: […] The thing that astonishes me the most is the fact that you have based your power upon popular suffrage, that is to say, the most inconsistent element I know. Tell me, then, I beseech you: have you said that you would be king?
Machiavelli: Yes, king.
Montesquieu: For life or hereditarily?
Machiavelli: I would be king as one is king in all the kingdoms of the world: a hereditary king with a descent summoned to succeed me from male to male, by order of progeny, with the perpetual exclusion of the women. Senatus consultum of November 7, 1852, Article 2

The imperial dignity is hereditary in the direct and legitimate descendants of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, from male to male, by order of primogeniture, and to the perpetual exclusion of women and their descendants.
Montesquieu: You are not gallant. (Cute)
Montesquieu: No doubt you will explain to me how you believe you can reconcile hereditary monarchy with the democratic suffrage of the United States.

It is interesting that the law of heredity is established through a Senatus Consult. This particular measure system seems to have been in place at least in 1852, which may have been the reason Joly brought it up in an earlier dialogue.

It turns out that the suffrage concerns only the members of parliament. All other positions in the executive are handpicked by the ruler.

Dialogue in Hell between Machiavelli and Montesquieu, Ch. 15 Subtext
Machiavelli: […] You know quite well that in monarchical States it is the government that names the functionaries of all levels.
Montesquieu: […] Those who are in charge of the administration of the villages are generally named by the inhabitants, even under monarchical governments.
Machiavelli: One would change this with a single law; in the future, they would be named by the government.
Montesquieu: And the nation’s representatives: it would be you who named them?
Machiavelli: You know quite well that this would not be possible. But I would never leave suffrage to its own devices.

To control the assemblies from going rogue and becoming a dangerous opposition, he has a list of measures ready.

Dialogue in Hell between Machiavelli and Montesquieu, Ch. 15 Subtext Constitution of 1852
Machiavelli: The first point would be to bind to the government all those who would want to represent the country. I would impose the solemnity of the oath upon all candidates. It would not be an oath to the nation, as your revolutionaries of ‘89 swore; I would require on oath of loyalty to the prince himself and his constitution. Title III, Article 14. - Ministers, members of the Senate, the Legislative Body and the Council of State, army and navy officers, magistrates and public officials shall take the following oath: “I swear obedience to the Constitution and loyalty to the President .”
Montesquieu: But in politics, since you would not fear to violate your oaths, how could you hope that they would be more scrupulous than you on this point?
Machiavelli: I count little upon the political conscience of men; I count upon the power of public opinion; no would dare to debase himself in front of this power by openly failing to uphold his sworn faith.

Under Napoleon’s tightening of power, purportedly this oath became a requirement. The constitution of 1852 requires it but not the constitution of 1848.

One must always remember that Joly’s perspective is that of the opposition under Napoleon III’s reign. Losing elections was a common theme for the opposition. Not until Charles-Louis Napoléon Bonaparte himself lost in an all-changing war against Prussia in 1870 where he was taken prisoner after the Battle of Sedan did the picture change.

Facing a crushing defeat against superior firepower, he ordered a surrender that saved thousands of lives of French soldiers.

Just because Joly makes a political attack against a despotism, it doesn’t mean that he represents the only truth. That must be kept in mind when reading the Protocols as well.

At the very least we need a better definition of “will of the people” if a popular despot attracts huge amounts of votes, even objectively speaking. Once we start to “problematise” with requirements like fair elections (subtext: The king’s elections must be faked, since nobody likes a despot), political awareness (subtext: The opposition must have a fair chance at brainwashing the peasants) and party representation over populism (subtext: We can’t compete with a popular guy), then we are simultaneously advocating for higher quality democracy while trying to shift the focus to something our opposition excels at or a fair ground for competition.

Half of such laments makes perfect sense in a democratic way, the other half is just an opposition trying to gain foothold.

But what happens when they do eventually gain a majority? The true representatives of the people? I think that is exactly what the Protocols are all about.

The Dialogue is a psychological window into the flip side image of Napoleon III’s own reality.

The Protocols is a psychological window into the flip side image of the reality of our representative democracy as it perceives itself.

We are the only species which dreams of living in a world of absolutes, and believe to do, but historians invariably uncover those as relative to the next generation.

Historians are condemned to see waves of culture rolling by, including our own of Geneva Conventions and civil rights. Even in our generation civil rights have changed its face compared with the 60s. Those are flags, banners around which ever changing generations unite. Of course ideas such as basic human rights can be said to have a fairly stable political content, but once the debate opens, especially on the world scene, hypocrisy is the order of the day, and in the river of news, we all end up as cultural driftwood.

I suspect that Charles-Louis’s requirement of an oath from candidates was one of his measures during the Second French Republic (1848-1852) during which he slowly grabbed control in difficult times until he inaugurated the Second French Empire (1852-1870) by staging a coup and making himself Emperor.

I can’t find it in the constitution of 1852 though.

Whether or not he in reality managed to direct the terrible ire of the people’s court by tying all opposition members by on oath to the emperor and his constitution, is up to the historians to judge.

Dialogue in Hell between Machiavelli and Montesquieu, Ch. 15 Subtext
Even less would one dare do so if the taking of this oath preceded the election instead of following it, and one would have no excuse for seeking out votes in these conditions if one did not decide in advance to serve me.
[…] During the elections, the parties have the habit of proclaiming their candidates and proposing them instead of those of the government. I would do as they do: I would have my own declared candidates and I would propose them instead of those of the parties.

The gist being that the people first and foremost want their emperor. What happens on the political scene is of little interest, as long as they do not challenge the ruler-subject relationship.

It isn’t hard to see what brought about Golovinski’s reaction.

I just love the following little exchange of words:

Dialogue in Hell between Machiavelli and Montesquieu, Ch. 15 Subtext
Machiavelli: Everything is of the greatest importance in this matter. “The laws that establish suffrage are fundamental; the manner in which suffrage is given is fundamental; the law that sets the manner of giving the notices of suffrage is fundamental.” Was it not you who said this?
Montesquieu: I do not always recognize my language when it comes from your mouth; it seems to me that the words you quoted apply to democratic governments.

Wonderful things happen when a writer quotes from another!

Meritocracy and despotism

Being born to a liberal society, I habitually equate industry with freedom. Free enterprise and competition drives society forward.

Across the river on the other shore, it all looks different. The political pendulum – swinging between chaos which is the fruit of liberation, and order being the fruit of people yearning for a strong man to end the strife – points to order in France by 1852.

Liberalism is a difficult engine to keep running in a stable condition.

Dialogue in Hell between Machiavelli and Montesquieu, Ch. 15 Subtext
Machiavelli: No doubt, and you have already been able to see that my politics would essentially consist in basing myself upon the people; that my real and declared goal would be to represent them, although I wear a crown. Depository of all the power that they have delegated to me, I alone would be their real representative. What I want, they would want; what I do, they would do.
Consequently, it is indispensable that, at the time of the election, the various factions could not substitute their influence for the one of which I am the armed personification. I have also found other means of paralyzing their efforts. It is necessary that you know, for example, that the law that prohibits meetings would naturally apply to those that could be held with the elections in mind. In this matter, the parties could neither get together nor understand each other.

Joly’s Machiavelli makes it sound naïve to think that you can convince people that you are the only one capable of changing society for the better.

But Joly is writing satire. Machiavelli comes across as a laughing puppeteer controlling society. Reading Charles-Louis’ own proclamation, one enters a universe where the will and ability to become the people’s man is real.

This “real” is a strange phenomenon. Something that subtends our actions, but only if we can keep our conscientious awareness of it secret. We must not divulge our covenant with our own guardian devil. Then this will to accomplish becomes a driving force making our words have a reality which the satirists can only mock impotently.

That is, until the tables turn and the world falls in the hands of the liberalists and the socialists. Then it is the satirists of the other side who must settle with mocking the will of the people.

Dialogue in Hell between Machiavelli and Montesquieu, Ch. 15 Subtext
Montesquieu: […] if the voters could not enlighten themselves through meetings or parleys, how would they vote with knowledge of the matters at hand?
Machiavelli: I see you are unfamiliar with the infinite art and boldness with which political passions thwart prohibitive measures. Do not bother with the voters; those who are animated by good intentions will always know how to vote. A matter of conscience.
Furthermore, I would make use of tolerance; not only would I not prohibit the meetings that would be formed in the interests of my candidates, but I would go as far as closing my eyes to the machinations of several popular candidacies that would noisily agitate in the name of liberty; but it is good to tell you that those who would cry the loudest would be my own men.

Charles-Louis may really have done all that he is accused of. I have no historical insight to brag about in this regard.

Likewise, I have no historical insight that could indicate that the opposition is not simply envious of the emperor’s popularity.

At least not yet.

Peasants and meetings

Napoleon III was popular in general, although less so in Paris and other cities. The opposition were well aware that the peasants were his main support, and so this critique finds its way into Machiavelli’s mouth.

Dialogue in Hell between Machiavelli and Montesquieu, Ch. 15 Subtext
Montesquieu: And how would you control the voting?
Machiavelli: First of all, in what concerns the countrysides, I would not want the voters going to vote in the large metropolitan centers, where they could come into contact with the oppositional spirit of the market towns and cities, and receive the instructions that could come from the capital; I would like that one votes according to village. The results of such an arrangement, which is apparently so simple, would nevertheless be considerable.

Joly subject the traditional political spectrum from urban to rural population to Machiavelli’s cartoonish two-dimensional mentality.

Historically speaking, monarchism survived as well in the French countryside as it did in the Russian countryside. Peasants were notoriously oblivious to the revolutionary forces brewing in cities.

Dialogue in Hell between Machiavelli and Montesquieu, Ch. 15 Subtext
Montesquieu: This is easy to understand: you would obligate the votes of the countrysides to be divided among the insignificant famous people or, lacking wellknown names, to refer them to the candidates designated by your government. I would be quite surprised if, in such a system, many able or talented people blossomed.
Machiavelli: Public order has less need of men of talent than men devoted to the government. Great ability sits upon the throne and among those who surround it; elsewhere it is useless; it is even harmful, because it can only be exercised against power.

Joly’s satire works by taking most of Napoleon’s tactics, which could just as easily be sincerely felt as cynical manipulation and by letting the one-dimensional Machiavelli express them, they are rendered flat and simple.

(Compare with Golovinski’s secret council who mocks the liberal’s attitudes as being cynical manipulation, turning the entire theoretical universe of liberalism and socialism into a flat landscape of cynical exploitation).

Dialogue in Hell between Machiavelli and Montesquieu, Ch. 15 Subtext Constitution of 1852
Machiavelli: For the reasons that I have stated, I also would not want balloting by list, which could falsify the election, which could permit the coalition of men and principles. Furthermore, I would divide the electoral colleges into a certain number of administrative districts in which there would only be room for the election of a single deputy and in which, consequently, each voter could only place one name on his ballot. Title V - Article 36. - Members of Parliament are elected by universal suffrage, without list voting.

As mentioned before, people are about their qualities as human beings. Voters would express their human trust in a specific person (or lacking that, sticking to the king’s men).

Parties and electoral lists are about theory. That would at the very least drive the rural population to seek awareness of political theory.

Gerrymandering and buying votes

Dialogue in Hell between Machiavelli and Montesquieu, Ch. 15 Subtext
Moreover, it would be necessary to have the possibility of neutralizing the opposition in the districts in which it would make itself too vividly felt. Thus, let us suppose that in previous elections, a district has made itself remarkable for the majority of its hostile votes or one had reason to foresee that it would come out against the government’s candidates: nothing would be easier than remedying this situation.
If this district only has a small population, one could unite it with a nearby or faraway district (but either way much larger), in which the hostile voices would be drowned or their political spirit would be lost. If, on the contrary, the hostile district has a large population, one could split it into several parts that would be annexed by nearby districts and that would could annihilate them.

Classical gerrymandering. Again, I have to let historians chime in with a verdict on the actual behaviour of Napoleon III and the correctness of the opposition’s claims.

Montesquieu asks if he wouldn’t just falsify the results by “inspecting” the votes. Machiavelli thinks those methods would be too obvious today and frankly not needed. Joly’s dialogue frames Napoleon Bonaparte’s efforts into a lurid context:

Dialogue in Hell between Machiavelli and Montesquieu, Ch. 15 Subtext
Machiavelli: This would be difficult to do today, and I believe that one should only use this means with the greatest prudence. A skillful government would have so many other resources! Without directly buying the vote, that is to say, by naked funds, nothing would be easier for such a government than making the populations vote as it wished by means of administrative concessions, by promising to build a port here, a market there, a road or a canal somewhere else; inversely, by giving nothing to the cities and towns in which the vote is hostile. Buying the votes the roman way.

Asked if Machiavelli wouldn’t fear that people saw through these tactics and erupted in hostility, he answers:

Dialogue in Hell between Machiavelli and Montesquieu, Ch. 15 Subtext
Machiavelli: You speak the language of fear: be reassured. By that point, I would have succeeded in so many things: I would not perish due to the infinitely small. […] I would be so advanced in my career that I could even brave storms without danger.
[…] The essential would be not so much committing no mistakes than maintaining responsibility with an energetic attitude that overwhelms my detractors. Although the opposition might manage to introduce into my chamber a few declaimers, what would this matter to me? I am not one of those who wants to count out the necessities of their times.
One of my great principles would be to set equals against each other. In the same way that I would use the press against the press, I would use the grandstand against the grandstand;
[…] Nineteen of the twenty members of the Chamber would be my men, who would vote according to orders, while I would move the strings of an artificial and clandestinely purchased opposition; once this was in place, one could make beautiful speeches, [but] they would enter the ears of my deputies like the wind into the keyhole of a lock. The Protocols just love to pick these elements up!

All in all it becomes even clearer to me now that the Protocols operate not just by irony but counter irony.

26th November

Interpretation is a dangerous beast. Barring direct human contact with all that entails like body language and tone of voice, interpretation can completely change the sign depending on your knowledge about the author’s procedure, particularly for enigmatical books that do not disclose their intention.

Every interpretive tactic I have applied to Golovinski, I can now retroactively apply to Joly as well.

Joly himself is something of a conundrum. He committed suicide, probably, at the age of 48, eight years after the end of Napoleon III’s time as emperor. As the constitutional amendment has it: “Any discussion aimed at criticizing or modifying the Constitution […] is prohibited” [Senatus consultum of July 18, 1866].

Hence he wrote satire. However, he already had seen how a previous satirical work of his was confiscated and destroyed, so he probably had no illusions about the problems he could end up in. Imprisoned 18 months from 1865 the Dialogue did not manage to circulate in France before 1868.

LEXICON ON MAURICE JOLY

Though it gained Joly the reputation of a scandalous and bully barrator, he sued ten newspapers, one after another, either for not accepting his stories or for not publishing news about him. Joly’s name was completely forgotten, and in life he did not attain the glory he so obsessively craved.

This makes reading him even more difficult.

For all that I know, he could be a mirror image of Golovinski!

PARADISE LOST