21st August
The Jews paid the price for the world’s anti-capitalism and resistance towards modernity.
So far this is my summary of the events.
Somehow, in some magical way, all the negatives of modernity ended up being on their shoulders, while the faces and names of capitalist magnates would emerge unscathed (unless they had a Jewish sounding name).
I have not seen one singular attack on Jews that was not really an attack on either the influence of money, the demoralising effects of bureaucracy or the severing of family bonds and other forms of kinship. The closest I have seen so far is mentioning their religion. The religious roots of the antagonism is almost as old as Christianity itself, and a strange relic from the past in a time where nobody could care less about who really killed Jesus, given that most people today even doubt he was ever born. If anything, this demonstrates how we live in the cathedral of our cultural hive mind, and the structure goes back centuries.
What I do start to see signs of after almost reading through half the Protocols is base vitriol against – not the race of Jews, but – the Jew’s perceived racism towards “the gentiles”.
But I am wary about assuming that racism as a social phenomenon could even have existed, had it not been for the revulsion over the cultural changes brought about by capitalism. A resentment over everything we praise today as the foundation of our modern society.
Sometimes, though, I do believe to see the embers of past centuries’ religious wars. Tribal wars.
22nd August
The industrial magnate can stand in full height and speak against Jews and praise patriotism.
So when the grinding wheels of modernity seemingly crushes us, he cannot be the one to blame.
There must be a shadow army behind him, a “deep-capitalism” consisting of treacherous board members, unionists, speculators as sell as a “deep-science” consisting of socialists, sociologists and liberal theorists that do this to us.
Could the aforementioned thinking be driving antisemitic forces in shaping the image of the Jews?
And yet, I still have failed in establishing the vital connection. Reading historical surveys of antisemitism, the pattern is usually the same. “Stories” simply start to be told. Rumours that are never broken circulate. I know that people usually have reasons and I always try to unlock those reasons.
Still I am faced with a hard choice. Should one really succumb to the pressure and accept that whatever our personal rationale, ideas fester in our minds driven by completely different forces that are much bigger than our own frail identity and imaginary rationalisations?
23rd August
Am I finally ready to surrender to the popular stance that the Protocols are just an antisemitic tool meant to taint the Jews?
No. It has its own political message. It sails along with Joly’s novel, but often departs and the departure reveals something about itself.
Black Hundreds and the Union of the Russian People
I embarked on this project with a nod to the Black Hundreds as one of several ultra-right factions in Russia before the fall of the Tzar. I could also have mentioned the Union of the Russian People. The Black perpetrated violence against political enemies and Jews.
What should I label antisemitism? Is it the violence perpetrated by a few or is it the fuzzy ideas common amongst a whole political group or perhaps even the schematic foundations shared by almost the entire population of the continent of Europe without which the Jews would never have entered into focus? Or even the human tribal biology and behaviour?
The Not Bored analysis of Joly
Today I reread the foreword to Maurice Joly’s Dialogue in Hell by the translator, Not Bored.
It is interesting that I myself do not see the clear signs of the Dialogue’s implicit critique of Montesquieu, of capitalism as a way of thinking. Ironically, I do see those aspects in Golovinski’s Protocols. Likely others would not see the Protocols as an attack on capitalism but on Jews.
They say:
Thus, the figure of Machiavelli is doubled: he “stands in” or “stands for” for Maurice Joly, and he also “stands in” or “for” Louis Bonaparte.
This schizophrenia is carried over into the Protocols as is flagrantly noticeable. The author excels in having the narrator speak with multiple tongues.
Not Bored reminds us that Joly understood the mental change we all undergo when our society starts to function according to capitalist rules. I must endeavour to spot it in his text as well.
Mostly I take note of what Machiavelli speaks: The mix of threats and popularity that the despot places his throne on.
The transformation they describe is another animal. It means despot and oppressed are more or less drifting down the same waterfall.
Another key point is that Montesquieu is also on trial. It was his political machinery which ought to have protected against despotism that were convertible to instruments of power. The Situationist group in order to explain what happened had to resort to an explanation of how money-centred thinking became an engine for change in outlook for all classes:
precisely because money is a way of thinking (a form of signifying) as well as a way of transacting (a system of exchange), even those who have not been bribed can be corrupted by money and those who have in fact been bribed need not be completely corrupted.
That is, all classes adopted a new way of thinking as well as adapted to a new calculus for interacting with each other. Once changed, they were captured in their new reality.
24th August
Dialogue 10
● Be explicit about the many opportunities where the people via their representatives can vote for changes. ● Be careful no opportunities arise to change anything of an essential nature. ● The Council of State dominates the courts in plenty of civil matters. ● The despot dominates the Council of State.
Joly spends a lot of time comparing to the Roman transformation from republic to principate.
| Dialogue 10 | Subtext |
|---|---|
Montesquieu: […] It is certain that, up to the last days of the Republic, the Roman Senate had been an autonomous institution, invested with immense privileges and real power; the depth of its political traditions and the grandeur that it imparted to the Republic were the secrets of its power. Starting with Augustus, the Senate became a mere instrument in the hands of the emperors, but one did not quite see by what succession of actions it came to be stripped of its power. |
The senate became a (troublesome) sidekick to the emperor. |
Machiavelli: […] For the moment, this question does not preoccupy me; I simply wanted to say to you that the Senate that I conceive must (alongside the prince) fulfill a political role that would be analogous to the role played by the Roman Senate in the aftermath of the fall of the Republic. |
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Montesquieu: So. But at that time, the laws were not voted upon by the popular associations; this was done with the aid of the senatus-consult. Is this what you would want? |
Senatus-consultus = not a law, but advice often followed to the letter. |
| Machiavelli: No: this would not be in conformity with the modern principles of constitutional rights. | Machiavelli is always the modernist. |
| Montesquieu: What thanks should one give you for such a scruple? | |
Machiavelli: I would have no need for this to decree what appears necessary to me. No legislative arrangement -- as you know -- can be proposed, except if it comes from me, and my decrees have the force of law. |
From the days of the coup where he rose up and stopped the civil war. |
| Montesquieu: It is true, you had forgotten to mention this point, which is not minor; but then I do not see to what ends you would reserve the Senate. |
It does indeed appear that the senate would be given formidable political powers, e.g. to evict a bad leader. Be not fooled. It is only appearance.
| Dialogue 10 | Subtext |
|---|---|
Machiavelli: Placed at the highest constitutional sphere, its direct intervention would only take place during solemn circumstances: for example, if it were necessary to engage in a fundamental covenant or if the sovereignty was in peril. |
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Machiavelli: Until now, the fixed idea of your modern constituents was to anticipate everything, to rule everything according to the charters that they gave to the people. I would not make such a mistake; I would not want to shut myself into an impenetrable circle; I would only fix things that are impossible to leave uncertain; I would leave a wide enough margin for change so that, in great crises, there would be other means of salvation than the disastrous expedient of revolution. |
The following passages are incongruent. I think this is where the figure of Machiavelli shows his double nature as the Not Bored team noticed in the preface.
Initially he opens up for immense powers to the senate:
| Dialogue 10 | Subtext |
|---|---|
| Machiavelli: And, concerning the Senate, I would inscribe in my constitution: “That the Senate, through a senatus-consult, | |
● rules upon everything that has not been anticipated by the constitution and that is necessary for its progress; |
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● that it fixes the meaning of the articles of the constitution that might give rise to different interpretations; |
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● that it supports or annuls all the acts that are referred to it as unconstitutional by the government or denounced by petitions lodged by the citizens; |
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● that it can propose the bases for projected laws that have great national interest; |
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● that it can propose modifications in the constitution that will be handed down by a senatus-consult.” |
The book now mirrors the battle on words that must have taken place in Joly’s time. If one actually tries to invoke any of these rules, one is dissuaded by an explanation that it their grievance is already anticipated and dealt with. No need for the senate.
The more the powers the senate ask for, the more illusionary powers they receive. Everything becomes both blacker and whiter each day. Plenty for everyone.
| Dialogue 10 | Subtext |
|---|---|
Montesquieu: All this is very good, and such a senate would truly be a Roman Senate. I will only make a few remarks about your constitution: it would be drafted in very vague and ambiguous terms because you have judged, in advance, that the articles that it contains would be susceptible to different interpretations. |
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Machiavelli: No, it will be necessary to anticipate everything. |
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Montesquieu: I would have believed that your principle in such matters would have been to avoid anticipating and regulating everything. |
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Machiavelli: […] it is necessary to anticipate what is essential. |
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| Montesquieu: Tell me, I beg you: your Senate, the interpreter and guardian of the fundamental pact: does it have a proper power? | |
| Machiavelli: Indubitably, no. | |
| Montesquieu: Everything that the Senate does, you would be the one doing it? | |
| Machiavelli: I am not saying the contrary to you. | |
Montesquieu: Whatever it interprets, you would be the one interpreting; whatever it modifies, you would be the one modifying; whatever it annuls, you would be the one annulling? |
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Montesquieu: […] I only ask you where would the weakest guarantee for the citizens be found in the midst of such a vast arbitrariness, and especially how could they ever agree to submit to it? |
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Machiavelli: […] I would not make any modification of the fundamental bases of my constitution without submitting it for the acceptance of the people by means of universal suffrage. |
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Is he slippery or is he more democratic than Montesquieu gives him credit for?
You never fight the people’s representatives, you always yield to the pressure. But you always yield to the people’s will, which the representatives do not always grasp. They are career politicians after all. Someone must be responsible and implement the people’s will. A plebiscite will show that the despot is on the right path.
| Dialogue 10 | Subtext |
|---|---|
Montesquieu: But it would still be you who would be the judge of the question of knowing if these modifications that you proposed carry within themselves the fundamental trait that requires that they be submitted to the sanction of the people. Nevertheless, I want to allow that you would not do through a decree or senatusconsult what must be done by plebiscite. Would you yield your constitutional amendments to discussion? Would you have them deliberated upon in the popular associations? |
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Machiavelli: Incontestably no. If the debate over constitutional articles were ever undertaken in the popular assemblies, nothing could prevent the people from taking possession of the examination of everything by virtue of their right to evocation, and the next day there would be revolution in the streets. |
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| Montesquieu: At least you are logical. So, constitutional amendments would be presented and accepted en bloc? | |
| Machiavelli: Not otherwise. | |
Machiavelli: […] Moreover, I need not add that I would also reserve for myself the nomination of the presidents and vice-presidents of this upper assembly. |
I’m afraid I cannot concur with the translators, Not Bored, at least not yet. To me, the level of sophistication they talk about is not that obvious.
We know and recognise this kind of dictator. He usurps the press and bullies his way to a favourable popularity.
Golovinski is not much different. Only his dictator is a secret society bullying the elected king. But he gets close to the very insight that Not Bored credits Joly with when he presents the economic and social sciences as the real masterpieces. Though he constantly attributes those to the Jewish brotherhood, the absurdities are massive. A world of “gentiles” too stupid to realise that their universities are educated in a dumbed down version of the real science, which only Jews can understand.
No, the council has just as little concrete existence as Joly’s Machiavelli, who are also not behind Louis Bonaparte in anything but the spirit (if even that).
Machiavelli and the Jewish council are imaginary king-makers.
The point of their existence is to bring coherence to the acts of a sitting monarch or a ruling government.
Council of State - the loophole to Stalinism
Let’s be frank. Most of the powers given to any executive are vested in small scale control of people’s lives.
In modern times this Council is either the cabinet itself or its role is, like that of the king’s, ceremonial at best.
The Council of State that is described here sounds like it has powers normally reserved for the courts.
One cannot help but to think of how Stalin controlled the party and the party penetrated all democratic bodies.
| Dialogue 10 | Subtext |
|---|---|
| Machiavelli: […] Concerning the Council of State, I will be more brief. Your modern institutions are such powerful instruments of centralization that it is almost impossible to make use of them without exercising sovereign authority. | |
According to your principles, what is the Council of State? It is a simulacrum of a political body that is intended to put into the hands of the prince a considerable power, the regulatory power, which is a kind of discretionary power, which can be used to make real laws when one wants to do so. |
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Moreover, the Council of State – according to your ideas (so one tells me) – is invested with a special attribute that is, perhaps, even more exorbitant. In contentious matters, it can (one assures me) claim by the right of evocation, and can reclaim by its own authority, in front of the ordinary tribunals, knowledge of all the litigation that appears to it to have an administrative character. |
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Thus – and to summarize in a phrase what is completely exceptional in this attribute – the courts must refuse to judge when they find themselves in the presence of an act of administrative authority, and the administrative authority can, in such cases, supersede the courts so as to refer the discussion to the Council of State. |
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Once more, then: what would the Council of State be? Would it have proper power? Would it be independent of the sovereign? Not at all. It would only be an Editorial Committee. When the Council of State makes a regulation, it would [in fact] be the sovereign who makes it; when it renders a judgment, it would [in fact] be the sovereign who renders it or, as one says today, it would be the administration, the administration who would be the judge and the jury of its own cases. Do you know anything stronger than this, and do you believe that there is more to do to establish absolute power in the States that are similarly organized? |
I can only assume political scientists are well aware of the balance one has to strike between the executive and the legislative branches. The government departments have quite a bit of discretionary power in many circumstances deemed too small to be of interest.
Enlarge that power or allow to let it move along axes unforeseen in the body of law or simply allow its discretionary power to overrule the normal rules, and it can grow unwieldy.
Montesquieu defends the institution by mentioning that it should not have that kind of power.
| Dialogue 10 | Subtext |
|---|---|
Montesquieu: Your critique is quite just, I agree, but since the Council of State would be an excellent institution in itself, nothing could be easier than giving it the necessary independence by isolating it – to a certain extent – from power. No doubt this would not be what you would do. |
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Machiavelli: Actually, I would maintain the type of unity in the institution that already exists there, I would restore it where it does not exist, by tightening the links of solidarity that I regard as indispensable. |
Isolated, there is little a department can do with, say, the right to infringe on privacy for purposes of control. But combine that with, say, interest in political affairs, and you have a power and a purpose - a dangerous duo.
| Dialogue 10 | Subtext |
|---|---|
| Machiavelli: You have not remarked that my constitution was silent about a crowd of established rights that would be incompatible with the new order of things that I would found. For example: | |
| freedom of the press, the right of [free] association, the independence of the magistracy, the right to suffrage, the election of municipal officials by the communes, the institution of the civic guards and many other things that would have to disappear or be profoundly modified. |
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| Montesquieu: But have you not implicitly recognized all these rights, since you solemnly recognized the principles of which these rights are the application? | |
| Machiavelli: I said to you that I would not recognize any principle or right in particular; moreover, the measures that I would take are only exceptions to the rule. | The “exceptions” are of course massive, but they confirm the existence of the rules. |
| Montesquieu: And these exceptions confirm it; this is just. |
The trick to abolishing these rights is to exploit the heat of the moment. At once take away them all and then promise to give them back when the time “is right”.
| Dialogue 10 | Subtext |
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Machiavelli: […] In The Prince, I wrote […] "In taking a state, its occupier must consider all those offenses which it is necessary for him to do, and do them all in one stroke, in order not to have to renew them every day, and not renewing them to reassure men and to earn them to himself by benefiting them. Whoever does otherwise, either out of timidity or because of bad counsel, is always constrained to keep the knife in hand; |
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The very day after the promulgation of my constitution, I would issue a succession of decrees that would have the force of law and that would, in a single blow, suppress the liberties and rights of which the exercise would be dangerous. |
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Would there not be mass riots and another civil war?
| Dialogue 10 | Subtext |
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| Montesquieu: […] Despite your vigorous hand and your insight, I confess to you that I have difficulty believing that the country would not revolt in response to a second coup d’état held in reserve behind the scenes. | |
Machiavelli: The country would willingly close its eyes, because, in this hypothesis, it would be weary of agitation, it would hope for rest like the desert sands do after the shower that follows the tempest. |
France handed over their liberties voluntarily. |
| […] | |
| Machiavelli: I hasten to tell you that I would solemnly promise to give back the liberties that I had suppressed after the parties are pacified. | |
| Montesquieu: I believe that one would wait forever. | |
| Machiavelli: It is possible. | |
Machiavelli: Do not be in such haste; you will see the use that I would make of this promise. Soon after, I would pass myself off as the most liberal man in my kingdom. |
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Montesquieu: I was not prepared for such a surprise; in the meantime, you would directly suppress all liberties. |
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Machiavelli: “Directly” is not the word of a statesman; I would not suppress anything directly; here the fox must work with the lion. What use is politics if one cannot gain through oblique routes the goal that cannot be obtained by a straight line? |
25th August
Is nazism progressive or reactionary?
The question is vexed. Progressively attacking sources of change to achieve a return to values from before philosophy diluted them.
Which is of course impossible, since the continuity is broken. The ties to the past have been severed by the very aggressive behaviour of the ideology striving to reach back.
Protocol 11
● Council of State an extended arm of the ruler. ● Repeat of the Dialogue’s methods to control the senate. ● Strong-arm the populace into a state of fear. ● The wolves and the sheep metaphor. ● The scattered race argument.
| Protocol 11 | Subtext | Dialogue 10 |
|---|---|---|
The council of the state will accentuate the power of the ruler. In its capacity as an official legislative body it will be, as it were, a committee for issuing the rulers’ commands. |
When the Council of State makes a regulation, it would [in fact] be the sovereign who makes it; when it renders a judgment, it would [in fact] be the sovereign who renders it or, as one says today, it would be the administration |
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Here then is a programme of the new constitution, which we are preparing for the world. We will make laws, and define constitutional rights and administer such by means of [1] edits of the legislative chamber, suggested by the president; [2] by means of general orders and orders of the senate and state council, and by means of decisions of the cabinet; and [3] when the opportune moment presents itself, by means of a coup d'état. |
All power to the president - Machiavelli’s invention, The council’s puppet. | Montesquieu: Let us recapitulate. You would make the laws in the form of 1) propositions by the Legislative Body; 2) decrees; 3) senatus-consults; 4) general regulations; 5) decrees of the Council of State; 6) ministerial regulations; and 7) coup d'état. |
In what follows, the author lavishes on mere jumbled sentences. He stays in line with the despot in the Dialogue who must come across to the people as infallible.
At this point, it is not the Jewish council being described (as they have no public face), but their puppet, the popular president and his cabinet.
| Protocol 11 | Subtext | Dialogue 10 |
|---|---|---|
| Thus, having roughly determined our plan of action, we will discuss such details as may be necessary for us to accomplish the revolution in the sets of wheels of the state mechanism in the direction which I have already indicated. | ||
By these details I mean freedom of the press, the rights of forming societies, freedom of religion, election of representatives of the people, and many other rights, which will have to vanish from the daily life of man. |
You have not remarked that my constitution was silent about a crowd of established rights that would be incompatible with the new order of things that I would found. For example: freedom of the press, the right of [free] association, the independence of the magistracy |
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If they do not altogether vanish, they will have to be fundamentally changed the day after the announcement of the new constitution. It would only be at this particular moment that it would be quite safe for us to announce all our changes, and for the following reason: |
Machiavelli: But to do this, I would have to choose my moment well, because an error in timing could ruin everything. |
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all perceptible changes at any other time might prove dangerous, because, if they were forcibly introduced and strictly and indiscriminately enforced, they might exasperate the people, as these would fear fresh changes in similar directions. |
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On the other hand, if the changes were to entail yet more indulgences, people would say that we recognise our mistakes and that might detract from the glory of infallibility of the new power. |
People become wolves if they smell a wounded prey. | So, constitutional amendments would be presented and accepted en bloc? |
They might also say that we had been frightened and were forced to yield. And were this the case, the world would never thank us, as they regard it as a right always to have concessions made to them. |
People cannot respect a weak leader. | |
If either of these impressions were made on the mind of the public, it would be extremely dangerous for the prestige of the new constitution. |
Is he projecting his own political understanding onto the party he criticises? |
How anybody could have read those parts as anything but bad taste humour is a riddle to me.
The number of times these two texts precedes Orwell’s 1984 are staggering. The constant redecoration of history reveals this kind of vanity of appearance that the Protocols have in mind.
The irony remains the same: Both texts seem to want to aim higher than criticise the purely material, but they cannot achieve it. In the end, they end up accomplishing no more than the kind of critique prevalent in the political circles that they wanted to target.
That at least is my conclusion for today.
| Protocol 11 | Subtext | Dialogue 10 |
|---|---|---|
It is essential for us that, from the first moment of its proclamation, whilst the people will be still suffering from the effects of the sudden change and will be in a state of terror and indecision, that they should realise that we are so powerful, so invulnerable, and so full of might, that we shall in no case take their interests into consideration. |
Montesquieu: That moment would be well-chosen. The country would still be terrorized by your coup d'état. |
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We shall want them to understand that we will not only ignore their opinion and wishes, but will be ready at any moment or place to suppress with a strong hand any expression or hint of opposition. |
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We shall want the people to understand that we have taken everything we wanted and that we will not, under any circumstances, allow them to share our power. |
Concerning your constitution, one could not refuse you anything, because you could take everything; |
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Then they will close their eyes to everything out of fear and will patiently await further developments. |
Machiavelli: The country would willingly close its eyes, because, in this hypothesis, it would be weary of agitation, it would hope for rest like the desert sands do after the shower that follows the tempest. |
I think Golovinski follows the currents of the Dialogues. He is now lead to a point where the regime can flex its muscles, and since he is full of venom, he attributes cruelty to the narrators.
These postulates have as much meaning as a conspiracy theory. Like those, they are not meant for the intellect, as any person at a glance can shoot them down, but for the emotion. If you are already slanted over the state of affairs in a certain direction, it feels good to accuse someone.
| Protocol 11 | Subtext | Dialogue 10 |
|---|---|---|
The Gentiles are like a flock of sheep — we are the wolves. And do you not know what the sheep do when wolves penetrate in to the sheepfold? They close their eyes to everything. To this they will be also driven, because we will promise to return to them all their liberties after subduing the world’s enemies and after bringing all parties into subjection. I need hardly tell you how long they would have to wait for the return of their liberties. |
Machiavelli: I hasten to tell you that I would solemnly promise to give back the liberties that I had suppressed after the parties are pacified. Montesquieu: I believe that one would wait forever. Machiavelli: It is possible. |
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For what reason were we induced to invent our policy and to instill the same into the Gentiles? We instilled this policy into them without letting them understand its inner meaning. |
Only those readers who already did not understand the philosophical developments in the 18th century could ever be swayed by the last sentence. What inner meaning, which remains impenetrable by non-Jewish professors at the university could he be talking about?
Now the author is contending himself with quoting the typical racist themes from the Black Hundreds and the Union of Russian People factions.
For the first time in the book, unmistaken references to Jews as a real ethnic group are starting to show.
And even then, the concept of Jewish people are inextricably interwoven with Masonry. Take away Freemasonry from the world and you remove the upper layer of force to the modern antisemitism, (not the Christian vs Jewish conflict going back to the early centuries of Europe.)
| Protocol 11 | Subtext | Dialogue 10 |
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What prompted us to adopt such a line of action, if it was not because we could not, as a scattered race, attain our object by direct means, but only by circumvention? This was the real cause and origin of our organisation of masonry, which those swine of Gentiles do not fathom, and the aims of which they do not even suspect. |
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They are decoyed by us into our mass of lodges, which appear to be nothing more than masonic in order to throw dust in the eyes of their comrades. |
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By the mercy of God His chosen people were scattered, and in this dispersal, which seemed to the world to be our weakness, has proved to be all our power, which has now brought us to the threshold of universal sovereignty. |
The Jews… for the first time a direct reference. | |
| We have not much more to build on these foundations in order to attain our aims. |
Scattered and erecting deceptive Masonic lodges, one can see the signs of a world conspiracy.
No, I do not believe the Protocols are tightening its grasp on the readers here. I think it is loosing the grasp.
26th August
The Protocols have increased the level of anger. Slowly words like “swine” are starting to appear in the vocabulary of the narrator. They also add less and less of their own. By now the author other more or less sticks to jumbling Joly’s text until he arrives at a confused mess of satisfactorily sinister character.
Obviously the Protocols are rabidly antisemitic. And yet, I have the audacity to read them as if they try to do something else than inflict harm. In the first half they certainly did have that.
I am not here to condemn antisemitism. I am trying to find the machinery that drives antisemitism and any other racism. I need to understand.
To anyone criticising me: Until now, the best explanation I can find for racism is love. So far, I have only seen that hate has a prerequisite in the most glowing affection for the human race. So if anybody ask me to condemn the Nazi movement and the Black Hundreds, they better not do it out of affection for the human race.
My god, the sheer atrociousness of it all. Can’t we do better?
I must press on. There are no easy solutions and least of all condemning.
Then again, who can I hurt? I am alone on an island writing in a diary.
PARADISE LOST